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RECENT DECISIONS
Chattel Mortgages-Conflict of Laws-Sale to Bona Fide Purchaser in
Michigan of Automobile Mortgaged in New York, the Mortgage Being Filed
in New York but not in Michigan.-Plaintiff, a New York corporation, as
security for a loan received a chattel mortgage, executed in New York, on an
automobile. The loan was payable in installments and under the mortgage the
automobile was not to be sold without the written consent of the mortgagee.
The mortgage was filed in New York and New Jersey, when the mortgagor,
representing that he was the owner of the automobile and had the unencum-
bered title to it, conveyed the automobile to the defendant, doing business in
Michigan. The defendant was unaware of the lien on the car and immediately
sold it. On default in payment of the loan, the plaintiff brought suit against the
defendant for conversion of the automobile, and judgment was given to the
plaintiff for the balance of the debt.
Held, judgment affirmed by a divided court. For a lien valid in another state
is not lost by failure to record in Michigan when the property is moved there
without the consent or knowledge of the chattel mortgagee. Mortgagees of
chattels perform a demanded service and should have protection in so doing
when the subject of their security is surreptitiously removed from the state
where the lien arose, not only in violation of the terms of the debtor's agree-
ment, but also in violation of the penal laws. Although an occasional bona fide
purchaser must suffer, a greater good is done in protecting the financing of
chattels where the mortgagee has done everything in his power to protect his
interest. Metro-Plan Inc. v. Kotcher-Turner Inc., 296 N.W. 304 (Mich. 1941).
Four dissenting judges concurred in the result on the ground that the de-
fendant was not a bona fide purchaser, but they were unwilling to overrule
previous Michigan decisions protecting bona fide purchasers of chattels mort-
gaged in a foreign state.
The Michigan court had held that laws for the recording of chattel mort-
gages could have no force beyond the jurisdiction of the sovereignty enacting
them, and record of the mortgage in another state was not notice to subsequent
purchasers. A mortgagee, to be protected where no notice could be made effec-
tual, had to take possession and not enable the mortgagor to take the property
where third persons had no means of discovering the encumbrance. Montgm-
ery v. Wight, 8 Mich. 143 (1860); Boydson v. Goodrich, 49 Mich. 65, 12 N.W.
913 (1882) ; Corbett v. Littlefield, 84 Mich. 30, 47 N.W. 581 (1890) ; Allison v.
Teeters, 176 Mich. 216, 142 N.W. 340 (1913).
The decision in the principal case brings Michigan into line with the over-
whelming majority of states. The general rule is stated in RESTATEMENT, COX-
nicr op LAws, (1936) Sec. 268 (1) : "If, after a chattel is validly mortgaged,
it is taken into another state without the consent of the mortgagee, the interest
of the mortgagee is not divested as a result of any dealings with the chattel in
the second state." Ordinarily state A in determining ownership of a chattel
brought into state A from state B will apply the law of state B in determining
such ownership. It is immaterial that the mortgage hasn't been recorded in
state 4, for the majority rule is based on the proposition that the validity of
contracts is dependent on the place where they are made, hence, on principles
of comity, chattel mortgages will be enforced according to the laws of state
B even though the laws of the forum are different. For where a mortgagee
acquires a valid property interest in a state, on property located in that
state, his interest in it is not divested by a mere removal of the property,
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without his knowledge, to another state. Mercantile Acceptance Co. v. Frank
et al, 203 Calif. 483, 265 Pac. 483 (1928). However, if the mortgage was
invalid by the law of the state of situs of the chattel at the time it was made,
removal of the chattel into another state does not give it validity and create
a property interest in favor of the mortgagee. 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935)
996.
Only two states, Texas and Pennsylvania, do not recognize the majority view
and refuse to uphold the rights of foreign mortgagees against the claims of
innocent purchasers or attaching creditors. In Kauffman and Baer v. Monroe
Motor Line Transp., 124 Pa. Super. 27, 187 Atl. 296 (1936), the court stated:
"Chattel mortgages generally are contrary to our public policy and will not pre-
vail against claims of bona fide purchasers or creditors. This rule applies even
though the chattel mortgage was executed outside of this State, in a jurisdiction
where such instruments are recognized and given full effect." A chattel mort-
gage, duly filed and recorded in Oklahoma, could not be enforced in Texas against
the property removed to that state as against innocent purchasers for value
without notice in such state, although the removal was without the knowledge
or consent of the mortgagee. Favmer v. Evans, 233 S.W. 101 (Tex. 1921).
Louisiana, like Michigan, had until recently followed the minority view, but in
General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Nuss, 195 La. 209, 196 So. 323 (1940) the
court construed its chattel mortgage statute in harmony with the majority rule.
A further problem arises where the property on which there is a chattel
mortgage is removed from State A, following the majority rule, to State B
following the minority rule, and there sold to a bona fide purchaser, who sub-
sequently removes the property to State C, which follows the majority rule, and
in which state the mortgagee brings suit for the mortgaged property. In Forgan
v. Bainbridge, 274 Pac. 155 (Ariz. 1928), the court applied the law of Arizona
and Illinois, which followed the majority rule and refused to apply the law of
Texas where the defendant acquired his title stating: "We are called on merely
to determine which title is entitled to priority under our laws, and on the
grounds that the Illinois title was acquired in a manner in harmony with our
laws and the Texas title in one repudiated by us, and that Illinois grants to us
the reciprocity which Texas denies, we think a true interpretation of the rule
of comity requires that we recognize the priority of the Illinois title." However,
a different result was reached in Delaware in the case of a chattel sold under
a conditional sale contract in Massachusetts and removed by the vendee to
Pennsylvania and sold to the defendant in the latter state. The defendant sub-
sequently removed the chattel to Delaware, but the court held that the defend-
ant's title was indefeasible, since he had purchased it in Pennsylvania, under
the rule that the Iex loci rei determines the status of personal property. Fuller
v. Webster, 27 Boyce (Del.) 538, 95 Atl. 335 (1915.
However, where the mortgaged chattel is taken into another state with the
consent of the mortgagee, the law of the latter state as to the filing of the
mortgage must be complied with and an attachment or sale of the chattel by
the mortgagor in possession is governed by the law of the situs thus given to
the property. Enterprise Optical Mfg. Co. v. Tivnner, 71 F. (2d) 295 (W.D.
Mich. 1934); Adamnson v. Fogelstrom, 221 Mo. A. Rep. 1243, 300 S.W. 841
(1927) ; Jones v. North Pac. Fish & Coal Co., 42 Wash. 332, 84 Pac. 1122 (1906).
This is the rule in most states, yet some have protected the property interest of
mortgagee even where he knew of, or consentd to, the removal to another state
of the mortgaged chattel, and not complying with the law of the latter state as to
the filing of chattel mortgages. Handley v. Harris, 48 Kan. 606, 29 Pac. 1145
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(1892); Greenville Nat. Bank v. Evans-Snider-Buel Co., 9 Okla. 353, 60 Pac.
249 (1900) ; Cobb v. Buswell, 37 Vt. 337 (1864).
Some states following the majority rule provide that foreign mortgages must
be filed within a reasonable time or a specified time in order to preserve the
foreign lien. In Finney v. Dryden, 214 Ala. 370, 108 So. 13 (1926), a mortgage in
one state, on a horse removed to Alabama, and not recorded therein within three
months after removal, as required by the Code, was held inoperative against the
lien of the defendant for training and developing the horse without notice of
the mortgage. A similar result was reached where the foreign mortgagee did
not discover the presence of the mortgaged automobile, in West Virginia, until
sixty days after the expiration of the three month period provided for the re-
cording of chattel mortgages on property located in that state. Southern Finance
Co. v. Zegar, 120 W.Va. 420, 198 S.E. 875 (1938).
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Domestic Relations-Breach of Promise to Marry-Effect of Statute Abol-
ishing "Heart Balm" Actions When Complaint Alleges Fraud.-A resident of
the State of New York brought an action in the District Court of Eastern
Pennsylvania against a resident of Pennsylvania alleging pecuniary loss as a re-
sult of her reliance on the defendant's false representations of an intention to
marry her. The defendant made a motion, in view of the New- York (and
Pennsylvania) statutes abolishing causes of action for damages for breach of
contract to marry, that the complaint should be dismissed. Plaintiff contended
that her claim was not one of contract predicated on "breach of promise" but an
action based on fraud and deceit and thus not within the statutory prohibition.
Held, motion granted. The policy of the New York Act is broader than its
letter; since the judicial process in the field of "heart-balm" claims had become
an instrument of extortion, the legislature saw fit to prevent court relief. A
breach of promise action based on fraud and deceit is barred, therefore, when
used to circumvent the statutory prohibition. A. B. v. C. D., 9 U.S.L. Week 2389,
36 F. Supp. 85 (E.D. Pa. 1941).
This holding helps to clear any doubt that may have existed as to the scope
of the New York Act which also abolished rights of action for damages for
alienation of affections, criminal conversation, and seduction. NEw YoRx Civim
PRAcTIcE AcT (1935) Ch. 263, § 61-a et seq. Similar statutes were enacted in
several other states at about the same time: Ind. Laws (1935) Ch. 208; ILL.
REv. STAT. ANN. (Smith-Hurd, 1935) Ch. 38, § 246; Ala. Gen. Acts (1935)
P. 70; Mich. Laws (1935) Ch. 266, § 14497; N. J. Laws (1935) Ch. 279; Pa.
Laws (1935) Title 48, § 171; Colo. Laws (1937) Ch. 111; VERNIER, AmFMxcAN
FAMILY LAws (1938 Supp.) § 5, p. 403. The Massachusetts Act abolished only
the action for breach of contract to marry. MAss. GEN. LAws (1938) Ch. 207,
§47A.
The New York statute abolishing actions for seduction and breach of prom-
ise to marry does not violate the constitutional prohibition against legislative
impairment of contracts, since that prohibition is aimed only at commercial con-
tracts. Fearon v. Treanor, 248 App. Div. 225, 228 N.Y. Supp. 368 (1936) ; affirmed,
272 N.Y. 268, 5 N.E. (2d) 815 (1936) ; appeal dismissed, 301 U.S. 667, 57 Sup. Ct.
933 (1937). The sections of the statute abolishing actions for alienation of
affections and criminal conversation were held not to be violative of the due
process clause of the Constitution's 14th Amendment. Hangfarn v. Mark, 274
N.Y. 22, 8 N.E. (2d) 47 (1937); appeal dismissed, 302 U.S. 641, 58 Sup. Ct. 57
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